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The Role of Country-level Institutional Factors in Escaping the Natural Resource Curse: 
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Abstract         
Empirical research shows that developing countries that are rich in natural resources tend to 
suffer slow economic growth and development due to various factors such as quality of 
institutions, governance, among others. The phenomenon of slow growth is widely known as 
the ‘natural resource-curse’ within the energy sector literature, and past research suggests 
that the membership of international non-governmental organisations and transparency are 
key factors in supporting economic development. However, limited research has been 
conducted to explore the key factors and their impact on the ‘natural resource-curse’. This 
study utilizes  222 cases from 18 of Ghana’s key stakeholders and finds that the membership 
of country’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and petroleum revenue 
management policies are insufficient to avert its ‘resource-curse’ unless they are 
complemented with country-level institutional factors such as the quality of institutions, 
quality of governance, government effectiveness, accountability, corruption control 
mechanisms, natural resource sustainability and effective accounting practices. 
Consequently, the study contributes to the deeper understanding of complex macro-level 
factors interlinked with the ‘natural resource-curse’. We also discuss the theoretical and 
practical implications of these findings, along with suggestions for future research. 
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Introduction 
Since oil discovery and exports have positively impacted upon developed countries (Larsen, 
2006), one would naturally conclude that petroleum discovery in developing countries 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (Yates, 2006), would be similarly advantageous to those 
economies. However, the likelihood that petroleum discovery in developing countries would be a 
blessing rather than a curse is an issue that is regularly debated within the energy sector literature 
and amongst policy makers (Ablo, 2015).The widely researched issue on the ‘natural resource-
curse’ hypothesis (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Kopiński et al., 
2013; Satti et al., 2014) also called ‘the paradox of plenty’ (Karl, 1997) assumes that developing 
countries that are rich in natural resources (Mikesell, 1997) are susceptible to petroleum revenue 
mismanagement, poor governance (Watts, 2004), rent-seeking behavior (Kopiński et al., 2013), 
corruption (Roberts, 2015), socio-economic and political crisis and conflicts (Le Billon, 2006) 
that can weaken democratic processes (McFerson, 2010), stability, growth and development 
(Robinson et al., 2006; Mehlum et al., 2006). This phenomenon is hypothesised that resource-rich 
developing countries tend to grow more slowly than their less resourced counterparts (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995, 1997, 2001; Humphreys et al., 2007). Though this paradox has attracted 
significant academic attention, studies have primarily focused on transparency and 
accountability, including efficient and equitable management of natural resource wealth in 
developing countries as being the antidote to the natural resource sustainability (Torvik 2002, 
2009; Collier et al., 2011; van der Ploeg, 2011; Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Corrigan, 2014).  
Subsequently, decades of intervention from the World Bank and the various structural adjustment 
and economic recovery programs by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Ghana is said to be 
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one of the fastest growing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa (Adams et al., 2017). It is seen as a 
beacon of democracy and progress in Africa, where international businesses strive, due to its 
socio-economic-political stability and peaceful environment (Adams et al., 2017). Ghana’s recent 
discovery of oil in commercial quantities prompted their membership in the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the implementation of policies supporting natural resource 
sustainability, in anticipation of achieving faster economic growth and development. In this ideal 
environment, and despite the misfortunes of some of the oil-rich Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries, one would expect Ghana to achieve significant economic growth and development as a 
natural outcome. It is against this background that Kopiński et al. (2013) come to their own 
conclusion that Ghana’s oil discovery cannot be a curse, but at worst, a treatable disease. 
However, studies into Ghana’s natural resources (e.g., Gyampo, 2016 and Gyimah-Boadi and 
Prempeh, 2012) reveal gaps in the legislative and institutional frameworks within Ghana’s 
petroleum sector. It is against these mixed findings, coupled with Ghana being a recent 
developing economy to join the Africa’s oil export giants and EITI that Ghana provides a good 
justification for the chosen context.  
Consequently, studies into the underlying causes and ultimate prevention of the ‘natural resource-
curse’ phenomenon reveal that there is a relationship between oil-rich developing countries, and 
negative traits such as corruption, ineffective accounting and control systems, revenue 
mismanagement, poor institutional quality, and ultimately economic stagnation. However, in 
contrast to the ‘natural resource-curse’ hypothesis, an investigation into the stimulating role of 
natural resource abundance with regard to financial development finds that natural resource 
abundance contributes to financial development and that economic growth and financial 
development correlate positively (Shahbaz et al., 2017). 
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In examining the ‘resource-curse’ phenomenon, Kopiński et al. (2013) establish that developing 
countries which are resource-rich are vulnerable to the petroleum revenue ‘rent-seeking 
behaviour’ of multinational corporations (MNCs). Kolk and Lenfant (2010) also argue that 
MNCs that lobby SSA governments to provide remarkably long tenure operational licenses and 
tariff protections are prevalent. In addition, Kolstad and Wiig (2009) and Frankel (2010) agree 
that natural resource revenue mismanagement seems to be one of the major factors contributing 
to a weakening in SSA’s democratic processes and economic development. There seems to be a 
consensus amongst many authors (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003; Auty, 2002; Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte, 2008; Davis and Tilton, 2005; Humphreys et al., 2007; Mehlum et al., 2006) that oil 
discovery in developing countries, particularly in Africa, remains a ‘curse’, rather than yielding 
economic advantage or sustainable development for those countries. 
Recently, several studies have focused this area of research towards a wider stakeholder-
management approach. These studies suggest that quantity of resource deposits and geographical 
concentration (Corrigan, 2014) including membership of the EITI could help natural resource-
rich developing countries to escape the ‘natural resource-curse’ (Van Alstine, 2014;  Sovacool 
and Andrews, 2015; Sovacool et al., 2016; Kasekende et al., 2016). Based on these arguments, 
measures to sustain accountability frameworks, quantity of resource deposits, and geographical 
concentration including efficient accounting and reporting systems and standards have become 
core requirements as developing countries attempt to escape the ‘natural resource-curse’ to 
ensure lasting economic transformation.  
 
Fresh insights have been presented by Abdo and Kouhy (2016) and Siakwah (2017) who argue 
that issues of oil boom periods (‘peak periods’) and their associated low world oil prices have 
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become widespread and increasingly problematic., The combined daily output of global oil 
producers reaches its peak and subsequently begins to decline. It is then argued that this results to 
oil windfall mismanagement which impacts negatively on individuals, oil firms, and governments 
in developing countries (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004, 2006) such as Ghana. Moreover, given the 
low standard of democratic and weak institutional structures (Gyampo, 2016), the call to examine 
the revenue management of new oil discoveries in SSA, in particular, is timely.  
 
The fundamental research question driving this paper is: To what extent can EITI membership, 
corruption mitigation strategies, the quality of institutions and quality of governance work to 
influence the escape from the resource-curse for natural resource-rich countries in Africa? 
Having been unable to cite any study which combines economic advantage (resource-curse) 
theories and transparency theories with EITI membership and corruption mitigation strategies, 
this paper contributes to the current resource-curse debate by explaining how the implementation 
of country-specific institutional initiatives could guarantee transparency and accountability in 
SSA’s energy sector. It therefore enriches the understanding of how oil-producing developing 
countries could overcome the resource-curse issue. Specifically, this work could help Ghana 
adopt resource-curse escape strategies and implement policy changes, which could contribute to 
its sustainable development and economic growth. 
 
The paper examines the literature around accountability and transparency, leading to the 
development of a conceptual framework for the research. The research context, and methodology 
adopted in collecting and analysing the data are then explained. Results are presented and 
conclusions outlined.  The paper closes with a discussion around the potential limitations of the 
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study, implications for policy development, and finally, identification of opportunities arising for 
future research. 
1.  Literature review and theoretical framework 
2.1Quality of institutions, quality of governance and government effectiveness  
Transparency and accountability for oil resources (Belal et al., 2013; Koessler and Lambert-
Mogiliansky, 2013; Cimpoeru and Cimpoeru, 2015) and financial reporting (Porter et al., 2003), 
including the EITI (Kasekende et al., 2016; Öge, 2016; Sovacool et al., 2016), and their influence 
on economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1997) and resource-curse and its possible escape 
(Collier et al., 2011; Al-Kasim et al., 2013; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2014) have been widely 
studied. Transparency protagonists, such as Corrigan (2014) and Kasekende et al. (2016) are of 
the view that the adoption of principles and memberships of organisations such as the EITI could 
help countries to escape the oil resource curse. However, Kolstad and Wiig (2009) argue that 
transparency alone is insufficient to eliminate corruption and avert the resource curse. In order to 
eliminate corruption, transparency must focus on improved access to information. Studies that 
have examined contextual issues in Africa (e.g., Gyampo, 2016 and Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 
2012) contend that the gaps in legislative and institutional frameworks in Ghana’s petroleum 
sector have signalled substantial inadequacies in the nation’s contemporary democratic 
dispensation. The authors’ description of the Ghanaian context as “factional,” “venomous,” and 
“acrimonious” suggests that Ghana’s oil discovery has resulted in a disintegration of politics and 
political culture. Personal attacks and ad hominem accusations have replaced principled policy-
based disagreements and discussions. Regular instances of political grandstanding and 
gamesmanship have marked the economic and political landscape since the discovery of oil in 
Ghana. In contrast to this, Kopiński et al. (2013) argue that Ghana’s stable political system, 
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coupled with their relative full-flavored diversiﬁed economy and civil society strength, makes it 
impossible for the oil discovery to ruin the economy. They hold the opinion that the ‘curse’ must 
be seen as a ‘treatable disease’.  
 
The debate on the resource-curse, according to Corrigan (2014), has its roots in the economic 
advantage and transparency philosophies, from which accountability, the quality of institutions, 
quality of governance, and corruption mitigation strategies emanated. The resource-curse theories 
explain the economic effects of natural resources abundance and relevant sustainable 
development. Robinson et al. (2006) believe that accountability, the quality of institutions, and 
the quality of governance all work to mitigate corruption. Furthermore, Sachs and Warner (2001) 
and Mehlum et al. (2006) argue that weak institutions impede growth rates in resource-rich 
countries and transparency and accountability have an effect on institutional quality, which then 
determine fiscal transparency and higher governance quality (Andreula et al., 2009; Boschini et 
al., 2007; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2008). Similarly, Farooq 
et al. (2013), Othman et al. (2014) and Rock and Bonnett (2004) agree that there is a link between 
effective accounting and a country’s supporting institutions in combating corruption.  
 
Studies by Satti et al. (2014) on the resource-curse hypothesis in oil abundant economies, agree 
that natural resource abundance may result in slower economic growth. Similarly, Ahmed et al. 
(2016) incorporate economic growth as a function of natural resources and discover that natural 
resource and macroeconomic factors could be simultaneously determined. They confirm that 
natural resource abundance impedes economic growth. In establishing the connection between 
natural resources and economic growth in developing countries, Sachs and Warner (1997) 
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discover that natural resource-rich states experience slow growth as compared to states with few 
natural resources. All these studies conclude that developing countries endowed with natural 
resource abundance suffer slow economic growth and development.  The question still remains, 
however, as to why most resource-rich economies perform economically well while others 
owning the same quantity of resources perform poorly economically (Torvik, 2009). The debate 
becomes more complex with further questions about the quantification of the natural resource 
sector. Whilst Corrigan (2014) argues that the realities of the existence of the resource curse 
depend on the resolution of the measurement, Sachs and Warner (2001) contend that it is better to 
consider a country’s resource concentration instead of assessing it on the per capita basis. The 
idea behind this is that oil concentration in a particular region can sometimes create a ‘crowding 
out effect’. These antecedents imply the quality of institutions becomes the fulcrum upon which 
economic growth could be achieved and sustained. Quality of institutions refers to the rule of law 
and government effectiveness in protecting rights of investors and creditors. The success stories 
of resource-rich states like Norway and Botswana have triggered researchers to study the quality 
of institutions, which plays a key role in developing the management of oil revenue (Corrigan, 
2014). Mehlum et al. (2006) state that institutions with poor quality are linked with slow growth 
rates in resource-rich countries. Contrary to Sachs and Warner’s (2001) study, they indicate that 
countries having institutions equipped with good quality management do not suffer the resource 
curse.  
 
In examining the economic performance of natural resource-rich economies in Africa, Collier and 
Gunning (1999) found that weak institutions and inadequate environmental management 
accounted for the slow economic growth. In a related study, Tornell and Lane (1999) noted that 
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economies with strong political institutions tended to suffer slow growth while power 
decentralisation hastens growth. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2008) also provide evidence for 
the significant connections between institutional quality, natural resources, and growth. They 
establish that natural resource abundance negatively affects institutional quality. Studying the 
impact of natural resources on economic growth, Boschini et al. (2007) state that strong and 
sufficient institutional quality can reverse a resource-curse into a socio-political and economic 
blessings. Robinson et al. (2006) also consider how resource abundance can affect societies. They 
find that politicians in states without strong institutions turn to ‘clientelism’ to undervalue the 
future, due to their limited likelihood of retaining power. This results in sudden outrageous 
supply, making ‘peak oil’ issues even more difficult to deal with. However, in a robust 
institutionalised economy, resource abundance may increase national income. Using a theoretical 
model to explain empirical issues concerning the natural resource curse, Cabrales and Hauk 
(2011) observe that resource discovery can lead to upheavals, particularly in weak 
institutionalised countries. It is worth noting that since the state might have less control over 
resource quantities, institutional quality becomes the ultimate crucial factor of results (El 
Anshasy and Katsaiti, 2013). It is from this literary perspective that the following hypothesis is 
drawn:  
H1: The quality of institution, quality of governance and government effectiveness are positively 
related to the ‘natural resource-curse’ escape.  
 
2.2 Accountability and corruption control mechanisms (ACM) 
Samimi and Abedini (2012) find that corruption is a crucial determinant that hinders 
macroeconomic performance in developing nations. Additionally, Farooq et al. (2013) and Rock 
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and Bonnett (2004) state that corruption slows economic growth and investment. Othman et al. 
(2014) believe that power, opportunities, and moral impurities are the main driving forces behind 
corruption in developing countries. Arezki and Brückner (2011) examine oil rents affecting 
corruption and state stability and find that a substantial increase in oil rents deepens corruption, 
which negatively affects political rights, particularly where there is high state participation in oil 
production. Furthermore, Ross (2001) explains the ‘rentier effect’, whereby governments of 
resource-rich nations practice less ‘tax rates and patronage’ in order to reduce tension towards 
accountable bodies. Since governments of oil resource-rich countries achieve high levels of 
revenue from oil rents, they therefore tend to focus less on taxation implementation. This makes 
them less accountable to the taxpayers and less motivated to embark on developmental projects to 
bring economic benefit to the country. Hence, Buccina et al. (2013) suggest that in order to avoid 
corrupt practices and to escape the resource-curse, there must be appropriate standards for 
financial reporting and disclosures, and this must include environmental aspects. Based on these 
studies, the paper presents the following hypothesis: 
H2: Accountability and corruption control mechanisms are positively related to the natural 
resource curse escape. 
 
2.3 Accounting and Petroleum revenue management (APRM) 
The paper also considers the role accounting plays regarding transparency and accountability 
issues in curbing corruption and the resource-curse in natural resource abundance economies 
(Belal et al., 2015; Holmgren Caicedo, 2015; Sikka and Lehman, 2015). Sargiacomo et al. (2015) 
argue that the adoption of best management accounting practices enhances the quality of 
accounting information delivery, which leads to effective resources management, firm survival 
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and competitiveness. The separation of ownership and management of oil production and revenue 
management, the emergence of private companies and certain key state institutions in developing 
countries call for the introduction of mandatory accountability. Stakeholders dealing with 
external financial statements require assurance that information reported in such documents is 
reliable (Porter et al., 2003). The International Financial Reporting Standard (number 6) has been 
specifically developed to deal with the accounting and reporting around mineral resources. Neu et 
al. (2015) argue that, as an anti-corruption mechanism, there must be internal controls and 
monitoring systems to minimise unethical issues and immoral behaviour. However, Sikka and 
Lehman (2015) argue that even if internal mechanisms in state departments are adequate, they 
might not guarantee substantial impact in reducing corrupt practices including securing and 
sustaining government contracts. In line with the above arguments, the paper develops the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: Accounting and petroleum revenue management practices are positively associated with the 
‘natural resource-curse’ escape. 
 
2.4 Natural resources sustainability and accounting (NRSA) 
Natural Resources sustainability accounting and reporting practices could be implemented in the 
context of natural resources, using insights from traditional financial reporting model (Gray, 
2010). Bebbington and Larrinaga (2014) recommend the need for sustainable development 
through the use of sustainable accounting. In support of this argument, Gray (2010) examines 
auto-critique of sustainability accounting and argues that there must be clarity of what 
sustainability really means to facilitate its application towards sustainable development. This 
comes with the responsibility to account for the environment and sustainability of natural 
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resources (Bartelmus, 2007). Jones (2010) and Noël et al. (2010) agree that in ensuring natural 
resource sustainability, correct and quality-controlled environmental accounting can never be 
underestimated. In essence, effective implementation of environmental accounting could 
contribute positively to socio-economic decision making (Cairns, 2006). In reviewing the factors 
that lead to the ‘natural resource-curse’, it is clear that quality governance, quality institutions, 
corruption mitigation strategies and membership of relevant organisations could all work as a 
precursor in order to avoid the ‘natural resource-curse’ in Africa, and Ghana in particular. In line 
with prior literature, the following hypothesis is developed:  
H4: Natural resource-sustainability and accounting practices are positively related to the 
natural resource curse escape. 
 
2.5 EITI membership (EITIM) 
In 2002, former UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, launched the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). This has developed international standards for resource-rich governments to 
ensure increased transparency and accountability (Corrigan, 2014). As of February 2016, the 
EITI has successfully enlisted 51 resource-rich countries as members (Kasekende et al., 2016) 
including Ghana. Currently, most of the EITI members are developing countries, and therefore, 
the impact of EITI, in terms of transparency and accountability in the oil and gas sector could be 
highly significant.  The European Union, African Union, G8 and G20, and the United Nations 
have collectively approved the EITI. Advocates of EITI membership argue that corruption in 
resource-rich countries could be mitigated substantially by disclosing oil and gas revenues and 
payments in member countries (Kasekende et al., 2016). The paper believes that a government’s 
participation in the EITI is a signal of that government’s willingness to reform, and ensure 
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transparency, by adopting best international standards. Furthermore, a member country’s failure 
to disclose oil and gas transactions may increase risks of reputational loss and disruption in 
financial aid or foreign investment (Corrigan, 2014). EITI membership is thus a positive wider-
reaching signal of a country’s commitment to sustainable natural resource management. In terms 
of EITI membership, this has made the biggest contribution in terms of setting standards to 
facilitate ‘transparency and accountability in resource-rich countries’. In his investigation into 
“breaking the resource curse” using EITI, Corrigan (2014) concludes that the EITI’s success in 
achieving its goals remains elusive. Furthermore, the perceived positive effects are inconclusive, 
since they are conditional upon the existence of resource abundance. Corrigan (2014) also 
concludes that though EITI has succeeded in protecting some nations from some selected items 
of the resource-curse, EITI itself is a recent development initiative and needs sufficient time to 
fully implement its policies. The paper therefore hypothesizes that: 
H5: EITI membership is positively related to the natural resource-curse escape. 
 
2.5 Conceptual framework 
From an examination and analysis of the literature, it is clear that transparency and 
accountability, along with improved and high quality institutional frameworks, are recognized 
antidotes mitigating the adverse effects of resource wealth in developing economies. As outlined 
earlier, if EITI represents a signal of a country’s preparedness to restructure institutions and 
enhance accountability and transparency, then membership must bring positive change in 
national level economic indicators (Corrigan, 2014). This paper argues that transparency alone is 
insufficient in supporting developing countries to escape the resource-curse. The paper argues 
that Ghana’s EITI membership, together with its corruption mitigation, quality institutions and 
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quality of governance all work to affect Ghana’s possibility of escaping the resource-curse, and 
this forms the basis of the conceptual framework of this paper. The methodology section sets out 
the procedures used to test each hypothesis presented in this framework. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Research context 
Ghana is amongst the fastest growing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa and has also been 
consistently considered as the beacon of democracy and progress (Adams et al., 2017). 
According to UNCTAD (2017), the country has subsequently become one of the top destinations 
for foreign direct investments (FDI) due to the prevailing favourable business environment. In 
2007, Ghana officially joined the group of Africa’s oil-rich states, after MNCs in conjunction 
with GNPC, discovered oil reserves in commercial quantities in the Jubilee Field, along the 
Western coast of Cape Three Points (Ayelazuno, 2014). Ghana is currently the 11th largest oil 
exporter in Africa, and the 47th largest oil exporter in the world, with daily production of 
106,000 liters from the Jubilee Field alone (McCaskie, 2008; Ayelazuno, 2014). Ghana is an 
appropriate location for this research since it is widely representative of most countries in the 
SSA region which adopted the World Bank and International Monetary Fund Structural 
Adjustment Programmes, deregulating and privatizing most of their state-owned enterprises 
(Debrah, 2002).  
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A number of factors could determine the potential for the ‘natural resource-curse’ escape. These 
include the quality of governance, quality of institutions, transparency and corruption mitigation 
and control mechanisms. The term quality of institutions refers to the quality of country-level 
institutions (public sector institutions) in Ghana (Robinson et al., 2006; Kopinski et al., 2013).  
Kaufmann et al. (2011) define governance as the traditions, practices and national-level 
institutions by which a country exercises its authority. Kolstad and Wiig (2009:522) define 
transparency as “public access to information, or timely and reliable economic, social and 
political information which is accessible to all relevant stakeholders”. They define corruption as 
the abuse of public office for private gain. Corrigan (2014) explains the EITI as the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative that aims to reduce the adverse effects of resource abundance 
through the promotion of transparency and accountability of resource revenues. 
3.2. Sampling strategy  
The total sample for the study was 222, comprising 18 key stakeholder units managing the 
petroleum fund, the legislature and public interest representatives (see table 1). Stratified simple 
random sampling is adopted since that provides equal opportunity for every member from each 
stratum to be selected. The following econometric specification was utilised: 
               
 Yit= β0+ β1QI +β2QG + β3GE +β4ACM + β5 APRM+ β5 NRSA + β5 EITIM + ε   
The independent variables include quality institutions (QI), quality governance (QG), 
government effectiveness (GE), accountability and corruption control mechanisms (ACM), 
accounting and petroleum revenue management (APRM), natural resources sustainability and 
accounting (NRSA) and EITI membership (EITIM). The dependent variable is “Ghana escaping 
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the natural resource curse”. In the literature review section, the paper argues that these factors 
contribute to the ‘natural resource-curse escape’. The sensitivity of each of these variables is 
examined and consideration is given to the extent to which they individually and collectively 
impact upon Ghana’s potential to escape the ‘natural resource-curse’. This can then be more 
widely applied to understand how the petroleum sector can sustain Ghana’s socio-economic and 
political stability, growth and development.  
 
3.3 Measurement scales 
The constructs (items) selected for this research were utlised in line with the procedures 
suggested by other researchers cited in the energy literature (Arezeki and Bruckner, 2011; Belal 
et al., 2013; Sargiacomo et al., 2015; Kasekende et al., 2016). A total of seven measures were 
used, namely: (1) the quality of institutions; (2) quality of governance; (3) government 
effectiveness; (4) accountability and corruption control mechanisms; (5) accounting and 
petroleum revenue management; (6) natural resources sustainability and accounting; and (7) EITI 
membership.  
The first three measures, including quality of institutions, quality of governance and government 
effectiveness are presented in hypothesis 1. Table 1 sets out a list of the stakeholders and public-
sector institutions involved in this research. Quality of governance includes the role of country-
level regulatory bodies in oil and gas revenue management (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012; 
Gyampo et al., 2016; Ullah et al., 2018). In the context of Ghana, these regulatory bodies include 
the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC), the Auditor General, and the 
Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC). Government effectiveness includes the role of the 
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political government, and judiciary in enhancing accountability, and transparency (Sachs and 
Warner, 2001; Mehlum et al., 2006).   Accountability and corruption control mechanisms are 
those national-level initiatives undertaken by the government in mitigating corruption. This also 
includes appropriate standards for reporting and disclosure of revenue management, including the 
environmental aspects of petroleum revenue management (Buccina et al., 2013).  Accounting and 
petroleum revenue management takes into account the role of management accounting, 
accounting information quality, internal control and monitoring systems in enhancing 
transparency, leading to effective natural resources management (Neu et al., 2015; Sikka and 
Lehman, 2015). Natural resources sustainability and accounting (NRSA) looks at the role of 
environmental accounting, and sustainability accounting practices that enhance sustainable 
development (Bartelmus, 2007, Gray, 2010). EITIM measures whether membership of the EITI 
helps a member country in escaping its ‘natural resources-curse’ (Corrigan, 2014).  The standards 
developed by the EITI aim to address the key governance issues of the oil, gas and mining sectors 
in developing countries. 
Table 1 presents the characteristics of the sample.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
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3. Findings 
------------------------------------- 
  Insert table 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 report the mean, minimum, maximum and standard 
deviations for all variables used in the analysis. For a total of 222 responses, the mean values for 
the set variables are as follows: quality of institutions (QI=2.505), quality governance 
(QG=3.3348), government effectiveness (GE=2.9310), accountability and corruption control 
mechanisms (ACM=4.7793), accounting and petroleum revenue management (APRM=2.9560), 
natural resources sustainability and accounting (NRSA=2.9883), EITI membership 
(EITIM=3.3153). The Likert scale was adopted, and each survey question was rated on a scale of 
1 to 5. Respondents were asked how country-level institutional factors help Ghana in escaping a 
natural resource curse. The lowest scale of 1 indicates that the respondent does not agree with the 
role of institutional factors in escaping the resource curse and a score of 5 represents full 
agreement.  
------------------------------------- 
  Insert table 3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
The findings in the context of each explanatory variable are set out in the following sections. The 
regression results in Table 3 demonstrate that quality institutions (QI) quality governance (QG) 
and government effectiveness (GE) are the significant determinants for Ghana in ‘escaping the 
natural resource-curse’. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis and the results for QI 
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and QG are strongly significant at 1 % level. Cabrales and Hauk's (2011) argue that resource 
discoveries have revolutionary potentials in states with weak institutions. They further argue that 
human capital adversely depends on natural resources. Additionally, Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2010) report a positive association between resource rent, corruption and democratic institutions. 
According to the results, out of 222 respondents, a total of 208 or  94% of stakeholders agreed, 
whilst only 11 stakeholders, constituting 5%, held different views with regard to the statement, 
“quality of institutions have a positive impact on Ghana’s resource-curse escape’’. This supports 
the findings previously reported by Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010). Therefore, the assumption 
that quality institutions stimulate growth and development in resource-rich developing economies 
is justified and upheld.  
 
Prior research shows that quality governance could be measured by better information flows 
which enhances transparency (Islam, 2003, 2006). Additionally, Nofianti and Suseno (2014) 
found that the competence of local government systems in facilitating internal controls 
significantly affected accountability performance of local government. Furthermore, Moore 
(2004) concludes that governance quality in developing nations may succeed if they focus more 
on local taxpayers in managing their financial resources. Results from this study reveal that out of 
the 222 responses, 215 respondents, representing 97% of the sample, strongly agreed that quality 
governance can influence Ghana’s ‘resource curse-escape’, with only 6 respondents, or around 
3% holding an opposing viewpoint. Critically, success for Ghana with regard to transparency and 
accountability, corruption mitigation, quality institutions and quality governance is dependent 
upon political will and a commitment to deliver quality governance. It appears that in anticipation 
of being re-elected into power, and considering also the reasonably peaceful and democratic 
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environment at the present time, Ghana’s government maintains at least an average level of 
transparency, accountability and quality governance.  
 
Consistent with the expectations set out in hypothesis 2, accountability and corruption control 
mechanisms (ACM) significantly impact upon the potential for Ghana in escaping the natural 
resources curse. Prior research suggests that any development-oriented initiative that does not 
include and drive democratic policies to bring sustainable change, might fail to achieve political 
stability, growth and development (Aslaksen, 2010; Barro, 1999; Block, 2002; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2009; Lehman and Thorne, 2015; Muller, 1995; Tsui, 2011). This study shows that, 
aside from 8 respondents comprising just 4% of the respondents who have varied opinions on the 
hypothesis that “corruption mitigation can help Ghana’s resource curse escape”, the remaining 
213 respondents, representing 96% of the sample, agreed that corruption mitigation is an 
important determinant of ‘natural resource-curse’ escape. This supports the argument that  
Ghana’s high corruption level should be mitigated in order to ensure its success in escaping the 
resource abundance curse (Gyampo, 2010, 2016; Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012). This study 
confirms that the contribution of corruption mitigation to the resource-curse escape cannot be 
underestimated. The paper did not find any significant role with regard to accounting and 
petroleum revenue management (APRM) in escaping the natural resource curse escape. The 
results also show that natural resource sustainability and accounting (NRSA) is an important 
determinant for escaping the ‘natural resource-curse’. The significantly positive relationship 
between NRSA and the dependent variable confirms hypothesis 4. Jones (2010) and Noël et al. 
(2010) agree that quality environmental accounting practices enhance accountability and 
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transparency in the energy sector. The finding thus confirms that effective environmental 
accounting could contribute positively to socio-economic decision making (Cairns, 2006). 
 
Finally, the study could not find any significance of EITI membership in escaping the natural 
resource-curse, and hence the work could not find any evidence in support of hypothesis 5. 
According to the survey results, out of 222 responses, only 46 respondents, representing 21%, 
agreed that Ghana’s EITI membership can help it escape the ‘natural resource-curse’ 
phenomenon. The remaining 175 respondents, representing 79%, maintained the view that 
Ghana’s EITI membership could not help in escaping the ‘natural resource-curse’. The probable 
reasons for these findings might be that since Ghana’s EITI membership is recent, it might not 
have had significant time to comply and effectively implement all the necessary EITI policies and 
principles.  This particular finding suggests that Ghana’s EITI membership cannot contribute 
significantly to Ghana’s current state of transparency and accountability in the energy sector, and 
therefore Ghana’s ‘natural resource-curse’ escape. 
  
5. Discussion and conclusion  
The study closely examined the variables affecting Ghana’s potential in escaping the ‘natural 
resource-curse’ as well as considering the means and the extent to which Ghana’s oil discovery 
could be a blessing instead of a curse. The findings of this research could be applied more 
broadly to other resource-rich developing countries in order to help them avoid the much-debated 
resource-curse. The study finds that quality governance, quality of institutions, government 
effectiveness, accountability and corruption control mechanisms, as well as natural resources 
sustainability accounting are the key determinants in escaping the ‘natural resource-curse’. The 
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study finds partial evidence in support of the contention that EITI membership could help in 
escaping the ‘natural resource-curse’ in the context of a developing country. The paper argues 
that a country’s oil discovery is an economic advantage over those countries with limited natural 
resources. In fact, oil discovery could be a blessing or a curse depending on how revenues 
relating to these resources are generated, managed, and reported. The findings suggest that the 
role of country-level institutional factors (quality institutions and quality governance) could play 
a significant role in ensuring transparency, accountability and sustainability in generating and 
managing revenues from natural resources. The findings of this study can be generalised to 
similar oil-rich developing countries suffering from weak institutional arrangements and legal 
systems. 
 
In terms of policy implications, our research provides insights for policy makers to embark on 
strategic institutional reforms and develop regulations for efficient and sustainable oil extraction 
and natural resources utilisation. Policy makers may introduce strategic accountability and anti-
corruption approaches in protecting its natural resources. These policies may focus on 
transparency in issuing licenses and contracts to mining companies, their subsidiaries and 
affiliates, in order to mitigate corruption within the petroleum sector. A clear policy on regular 
(periodic) public disclosure of oil contracts, revenues and expenditures may increase investment 
and improve public confidence. In addition, an autonomous public-sector accountability board, 
which is free from any political interference, may also help in promoting accountability and 
transparency in the energy sector.  
 
 22 
 
The study also suggests that strengthening the legal and judicial system may further increase 
accountability in the energy sector. A stronger legal and political system can facilitate speedy 
socio-economic growth and development, which may help Ghana’s ‘natural resource-curse’ 
escape. The paper also suggests that international regulatory and funding bodies (e.g., EITI, IMF, 
and African Development Bank) could play a leading role in ensuring greater transparency and 
demonstrable policy actions. 
 
The study’s findings are subject to limitations. Firstly, the study could have considered the 
petroleum production levels, world market prices, revenues and expenditures, including from the 
time Ghana began oil extraction. However, carrying out such macro-level analysis is beyond the 
scope of our investigation at this time. In terms of future research, a cross-country study could be 
carried out for Sub-Saharan African countries in order to understand how cross-country 
differences in institutional quality may help mitigate the ‘natural resource-curse’. There is also 
potential for future studies to explore the relationship between country-level factors (GDP, rule of 
law, judicial effectiveness, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, control of corruption, 
political stability, investor protection, creditor rights) and their impact on oil exploration and 
petroleum revenue management within an international context.      
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Table 1 
Sample Characteristics 
Stakeholders                                                                          Population    Responses        % 
A. Ghana's Oil and Gas Revenue Governing Board                  48            41                85 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP)                   5               5               100 
Bank of Ghana (BOG)                                                                      3               3               100 
Investment Advisory Committee (IAC)                                           6               4                67 
Petroleum and Energy Ministry                                                       2               2                100 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC)                            5               5                100 
Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC)                   13             11               85 
Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC)                                           5               5               100 
Controller and Accountant General Department (CAGD)               3              2                67 
Auditor General (AG)                                                                       3              2                67 
Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA)                                                    3              2                67 
Sub-total                                                                                          48            41               85 
B. Other Stakeholders 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Staff                                  80            45                56                                         
Ministry of Finance     Staff                                                             50             30               60 
Petroleum and Energy Ministry (PEM) Staff                                  35              20               57 
Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC) Staff                 15              9                 60 
Past Governing Members                                                                 37             13                35 
Parliamentarians                                                                              110           52                47 
Researchers                                                                                      20              9                 45 
Policy Analysts                                                                                 5                3                 60              
 
 
Table 2 
     Descriptive Statistics 
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
 QI 1.50 3.75 2.5056 0.49628 
 QG 2.22 4.33 3.3348 0.43600 
 GE 1.83 4.00 2.9310 0.61931 
 ACM 3.00 5.00 4.7793 0.53891 
 APRM 2.28 4.24 2.9560 0.50367 
 NRSA 2.00 4.20 2.9883 0.48994 
 EITIM 1.00 5.00 3.3153 1.07191 
 DV 1.67 5.00 3.2508 0.68283 
 N 222.00         
Variables keys: quality of institutions (QI), Quality of governance (CG), Government effectiveness (GE), Accountability 
and corruption control mechanisms (ACM), Accounting and petroleum revenue management (APRM), Natural resources 
sustainability and accounting (NRSA), EITI membership (EITIM). Dependent variable, the natural resource curse is 
denoted by DV. 
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Table 3  
The impact of country-level institutional factor in escaping the natural resource curse  
Variables Beta t-values Sig 
QI 0.146 2.041 0.042 
QG 0.172 3.040 0.003 
GE 0.148 1.801 0.073 
ACM 0.134 2.380 0.018 
APRM 0.057 0.747 0.456 
NRSA 0.274 3.576 0.000 
EITIM 0.012 0.215 0.830 
R Square 
 
 
 
0.331 
  
Adjusted R Square 
N 
0.309 
222     
Variables keys: Quality of institutions (QI), Quality of governance (QG), Government effectiveness (GE), Accountability 
and corruption control mechanisms (ACM), Accounting and petroleum revenue management (APRM), Natural resources 
sustainability and accounting (NRSA), EITI membership (EITIM).  
 
 
